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ABSTRACT: In work culminating in Know How (2009), Jason Stanley argues, against Gilbert Ryle, that knowledge-how 
is a species of knowledge-that. In How Propaganda Works (2015), Stanley portrays this work as undermining 
a “flawed ideology” supporting elitist valuations of intellectual work and workers. However, the link between 
Stanley’s two philosophical projects is weak. Ryle’s distinction between knowledge-how and knowledge-that 
lacks the political consequences foreseen by Stanley. Versions of “intellectualism” have as much potential to 
align with hierarchical political systems as do versions of “anti-intellectualism.” Consequently, the debate about 
knowledge-how and knowledge-that comes apart from Stanley’s more recent concerns about flawed ideologies.
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RESUMEN: En un trabajo que encuentra su culminación en Know How (2009), Jason Stanely argumenta, en contra de 
Gilbert Ryle, que el saber-cómo es una especie del saber-qué. En How Propaganda Works (2015), Stanley pre-
senta su trabajo como debilitador de una “falsa ideología” que respalda valoraciones elitistas del trabajo inte-
lectual y los trabajadores intelectuales. Sin embargo, la conexión entre los dos proyectos filosóficos de Stanley 
es débil. La distinción de Ryle entre saber-cómo y saber-qué no tiene las consecuencias políticas previstas por 
Stanley. Algunas versiones del “intelectualismo” tienen el mismo potencial para alinearse con sistemas políticos 
jerárquico que algunas versiones del “anti-intelectualismo”. En consecuencia, el debate en torno a las nociones 
de saber-cómo y saber-qué no tiene incidencia sobre la preocupación más reciente de Stanley acerca de las ideo-
logías falsas.
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I. Introduction
In Chapter Six of How Propaganda Works, “The Ideology of Elites,” Jason Stanley provides 
a case study of a “flawed ideology,” which functions to explain and justify an unjust social 
distribution of goods, and prevents both the privileged elites who benefit from this distri-
1 I received helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper from participants in the Wittgenstein 
Workshop at the University of Chicago, as well as from an anonymous referee. I thank Fiona Richard-
son, librarian of Linacre College, for allowing me unfettered access to the books donated by Ryle to the 
College library upon his retirement in 1968.
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bution, and those oppressed by it, from coming to knowledge of the injustice of the struc-
tures of their society. This ideology combines a belief in the meritocratic nature of the dis-
tribution of wealth with a belief in a natural distinction between two classes of humans: 
those suited to intellectual work, and those suited to mere manual labor. In the Preface, 
Stanley connects his earlier work on practical knowledge with his critique of this ideology: 
“The second project that has occupied me over the last fifteen years, including in my book 
Know How, published in 2011, has been a thoroughgoing repudiation of the scientific and 
philosophical basis of this ideology.” (Stanley 2015, xix) In that project, Stanley had argued 
against the distinction, drawn by Gilbert Ryle in the middle of the twentieth century, be-
tween knowledge-how and knowledge-that, and defended a “reasonable intellectualism,” 
according to which knowledge-how is a species of knowledge-that. The link that Stanley 
sees between this earlier project and his critique of the ideology of elites is revealed in How 
Propaganda Works when he moves smoothly from discussing a distinction between “theo-
retical activity” and “manual labor,” to one between “theoretical reflection” and “practical 
skill.” (Stanley 2015, 271, 278)
This essay concerns the supposed link Stanley wishes to make between his two philo-
sophical projects. I will argue that Stanley has failed to connect them as tightly as he imag-
ines. A consideration of Ryle’s views on knowledge shows that Ryle’s version of the distinc-
tion between knowledge-how and knowledge-that has none of the political consequences 
foreseen by Stanley. Moreover, Ryle’s writings provide materials to argue that versions of 
“intellectualism” have as much potential to align with hierarchical political systems as do 
versions of the distinction between practical and theoretical knowledge. Consequently, the 
issue of the relationship between knowledge-how and knowledge-that is strictly orthogonal 
to Stanley’s more recent concerns about flawed ideologies. None of this undercuts Stanley’s 
insightful analysis of the complex relationship between demagoguery and flawed ideology, 
or indeed his critique of the ideology that is his main target in “The Ideology of Elites.” It 
does, however, raise challenging questions about the source of his conviction that the latter 
project depends on his earlier defense of intellectualism.
II. Background: Ryle’s distinction and Stanley’s intellectualism
I begin with a brief summary of Ryle’s and Stanley’s respective accounts of the relation of 
knowledge-how and knowledge-that. Ryle contended that “knowledge-how cannot be 
defined in terms of knowledge-that.” (Ryle 1971c, 215) He approached this conclusion 
through a critical discussion of the “intellectualist legend,” that “… practical activities merit 
their titles ‘intelligent,’ ‘clever’, and the rest only because they are accompanied by … inter-
nal acts of considering propositions…” (Ryle 1971c, 212, 215) He assimilated knowing-
how to intelligent action, and concluded that knowledge-how cannot be explained in terms 
of explicit guidance by propositional knowledge. According to Ryle, the intellectualist in-
correctly assumes “that the primary exercise of minds consists in finding the answers to 
questions and that their other occupations are merely applications of considered truths or 
even regrettable distractions from their consideration.” (Ryle 1949, 26)
Stanley, in contrast, argues for an intellectualist view of knowledge-how as “simply a 
species of knowledge-that.” (Stanley and Williamson 2001, 411) Like Ryle’s intellectu-
alist, he links knowledge-how with knowledge of the answers to questions: “…when you 
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learned how to swim … you learned … the proposition that answers a question – the ques-
tion ‘How could you swim?’ Knowing how to do something therefore amounts to know-
ing the answer to a question.” (Stanley 2011b, vi) On his view, for S to know how to V is 
for S to know that W is a way in which S herself could V, for some way W with which S is 
acquainted. (Stanley 2011b, 122) Stanley defends this account with arguments stemming 
from the linguistic theory of embedded questions, and develops his theory to encompass a 
wide variety of related phenomena, such as the learning of complex skills.
Ryle, however, constructed regress arguments against his intellectualist opponent, 
along the following lines: since the application of propositional knowledge can be carried 
out intelligently or stupidly, if intellectualism is true, “no intelligent act, practical or the-
oretical, could ever begin.” (Ryle 1971c, 213) But, Stanley replies, such arguments only 
undermine “unreasonable intellectualists,” who hold that “intelligent action requires a 
prior act of self-avowing the propositional knowledge that guides one’s actions.” (Stanley 
2011b, 14) His own “reasonable intellectualism” denies this assumption: “someone can 
act on their propositional knowledge without a prior act of contemplating a proposition.” 
(Stanley 2011b, 15) Even if we accept Stanley’s counter to the regress argument, Ryle has 
other arguments, such as the fact that knowledge-how, unlike knowledge-that, comes in 
degrees, and can be acquired gradually. (Ryle 1949, 59) Stanley again replies that his theory 
can account for such apparent “non-parallelisms” between knowledge-how and knowledge-
that. (Stanley 2011b, 32ff) It would take us too far afield to evaluate this debate; I will only 
mention here that Ellen Fridland has generated some serious difficulties for Stanley’s intel-
lectualism, related to Rylean concerns about the “gradability” of knowledge-how.
III. Stanley’s political critique of the practical/theoretical distinction
Stanley and Williamson claim that Ryle’s distinction “impoverishes our understanding of 
human action, by obscuring the way in which it is informed by intelligence.” (Stanley and 
Williamson 2001, 444) For Stanley, this is not a merely theoretical point. It has deep and 
important political consequences: the distinction between practical and theoretical knowl-
edge promotes an undemocratic and hierarchical view of human nature. Stanley presents 
this argument in a 2012 New York Times op-ed piece, “The Practical and the Theoretical,” 
and builds on it in How Propaganda Works. In the Times piece, he states that “Our society 
is divided into castes based upon a supposed division between theoretical knowledge and 
practical skill. The college professor holds forth on television, as the plumber fumes about 
detached ivory tower intellectuals.” He links the distinction between practical and theo-
retical knowledge to the idea that “exercises of theoretical knowledge involve active reflec-
tion, engagement with the propositions or rules of the theory in question that guides the 
subsequent exercise of the knowledge,” while “practical knowledge is exercised automati-
cally and without reflection.” This supports an anti-democratic hierarchy in which knowl-
edge workers are thought to be superior to those whose work involves only “knowledge” so-
called. Fortunately, however, his own philosophical work frees us from this danger: “once 
one bears down on the supposed distinction between practical knowledge and knowledge 
of truths, it breaks down. The plumber’s or electrician’s activities are a manifestation of 
the same kind of intelligence as the scientist’s or historian’s latest articles — knowledge 
of truths.” Stanley concludes: “The distinction between the practical and the theoretical 
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is used to warehouse society into groups. It alienates and divides. It is fortunate that it is 
nothing more than a fiction.” (Stanley 2012)
In the final chapter of How Propaganda Works, Stanley elaborates this moral and polit-
ical critique of the practical/theoretical distinction. He summarizes his argument in the In-
troduction (Stanley 2015, xviii-xix):
…the desire to relegate one group of society to the task of manual labor is a powerful feature of 
human social psychology. The justification for such a division of labor is typically based on dif-
ferential attributions of the human capacity for theoretical reflection. Some groups, it is said, are 
best equipped for practical tasks and others for theoretical tasks, a view that has traditionally been 
at the basis of the justification of slavery. But almost every society, whether or not it has a practice 
of slavery, endorses some version of it.
Stanley leads from this summary directly to the claim quoted above, that his earlier work 
on knowledge-how undermines the scientific and philosophical basis of this ideology.
Stanley does not mention Ryle by name in either the Times op-ed or in How Propa-
ganda Works. But he does argue that his previous work on knowledge-how can help to 
liberate us from a hierarchical division of society into castes by showing the distinction 
between practical knowledge and knowledge of truths to be an illusion, and that his intel-
lectualism undermines the philosophical basis of the ideology that justifies slavery. I will 
argue, however, that Ryle’s non-intellectualist distinction between knowledge-how and 
knowledge-that does not support such an ideology and does not entail alienation, division, 
and the warehousing of society into groups. Hence, Stanley’s intellectualism cannot be the 
required cure of the social ills and flawed ideologies diagnosed in How Propaganda Works. 
The question of the relation of knowledge-how and knowledge-that is strictly orthogonal 
to the issues Stanley addresses in his attack on propaganda and flawed ideologies.
IV. Ryle on knowledge
I begin by outlining Ryle’s positive view of the relationship between knowledge-how and 
knowledge-that.2 The crucial point is due to David Wiggins: for Ryle, knowledge-how is 
not a species of knowledge-that – but neither are things the other way around. As Wiggins 
points out, “To say that knowing how to V and knowing that p represent or manifest dif-
ferent determinable powers of mind and the second cannot subsume the first is not to say 
that these powers can be activated separately or to deny that they have manifold relations 
of interdependence.” Wiggins adds that “Ryle is in a position not merely to allow but also 
to assert that, in their full distinctness, knowing how to and knowing that need one an-
other,” so that there is a “constant back-and-forth between knowledge that rests on the 
practical and knowledge which rests on the propositional.” (Wiggins 2009, 264-5) Wig-
gins illustrates this “back and forth” with several examples. But the form of interdepend-
ence they exhibit is, for Ryle, part of the very structure of knowledge, both propositional 
and practical.
2 The following is a dogmatic summary. In “A Capacity to Get Things Right” I develop my interpreta-
tion in detail, providing more textual evidence than is possible here.
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In a slogan: for Ryle, the relation of knowledge-how to knowledge-that is not that of 
species to genus; it is more like that of two species to a common genus.3 The core concept 
of knowledge is that of a capacity to get things right. This is specified into the concepts of 
knowledge-how and knowledge-that:
— “What is involved in our descriptions of people as knowing how to make and ap-
preciate jokes, to talk grammatically, to play chess, to fish, or to argue? …A person’s 
performance is described as careful or skilful, if in his operations he is ready to de-
tect and correct lapses, to repeat and improve upon successes, to profit from the ex-
amples of others and so forth. He applies criteria in performing critically, that is, in 
trying to get things right.” (Ryle 1949, 29)
— “‘Know’ is a capacity verb, and a capacity verb of that special sort that is used for sig-
nifying that the person described can bring things off, or get things right. ‘Believe’, 
on the other hand, is a tendency verb and one which does not connote that any-
thing is brought off or got right.” (Ryle 1949, 133-4)
Ryle’s does not think, however, that propositional knowledge amounts to the capacity to 
“get right” the answer to a question.4 Rather, just as the tendency that is propositional be-
lief is exhibited in multifarious behavior and feeling, so is the capacity that is propositional 
knowledge (Ryle 1949, 134-5):
Certainly to believe that the ice is dangerously thin is to be unhesitant in telling oneself and 
others that it is thin, in acquiescing in other people’s assertions to that effect, in objecting to state-
ments to the contrary, in drawing consequences from the original proposition, and so forth. But it 
is also to be prone to skate warily, to shudder, to dwell in imagination on possible disasters and to 
warn other skaters. It is a propensity not only to make certain theoretical moves but also to make 
certain executive and imaginative moves, as well as to have certain feelings. …
A person who knows that the ice is thin, and also cares whether it is thin or thick, will, of 
course, be apt to act and react in these ways too. But to say that he keeps to the edge, because he 
knows that the ice is thin, is to employ quite a different sense of ‘because’, or to give quite a dif-
ferent sort of ‘explanation’, from that conveyed by saying that he keeps to the edge because he be-
lieves that the ice is thin.
Following John Hyman, I interpret this pregnant passage as saying that one who knows that 
the ice is thin has the capacity to take the fact that the ice is thin to be a reason for action – and 
so to “get things right” in her action by being guided by the way the world is. (Hyman 1999, 
442, 446; Hyman 2015, 171)
For Ryle, then, both knowledge-how and knowledge-that are capacities. But as Wig-
gins pointed out, these two capacities are interdependent. Ryle argues that knowledge-that 
depends on various forms of observational and intellectual knowledge-how: “to know a 
truth, I must have discovered or established it. But discovering and establishing are intel-
ligent operations.” He concludes that “mathematics, philosophy, tactics, scientific method, 
3 This formulation will do for our purposes; I develop a more careful interpretation in “A Capacity to 
Get Things Right.” I argue there that for Ryle, “know” is a polysemous term, and “knows how” and 
“knows that” are analogically related, like the different senses of “exists” in which tables and numbers 
can be said to exist.
4 (Hartland-Swann 1956) interprets Ryle as committed to such a view.
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and literary style are not bodies of information but branches of know how” and that even 
“a scientist … is primarily a knower-how and only secondarily a knower-that.” (Ryle 1971c, 
224) Knowledge-how also depends on knowledge-that, since to “apply criteria in perform-
ing critically” one must be aware of what one is doing, how well one is succeeding, what is 
going on in one’s environment, and so on. Ryle puts this point by saying that in acquiring a 
skill one becomes one’s own coach and referee. He uses this idea to explain how we can “ex-
pect a person who applies his mind to anything to be able to tell, without research, what he 
has been engaged in or occupied with” – that is, to have knowledge of what they have been 
doing without engaging in study of it.5 (Ryle 1949, 147-8)
This sketch of Ryle’s conception of knowledge already suggests that Stanley’s concerns 
about the distinction between practical and theoretical knowledge do not carry over to 
Ryle’s distinction between knowledge-how and knowledge-that. Both Stanley’s college pro-
fessor and Stanley’s plumber are, for Ryle, as much knowers-how as knowers-that. Ryle’s 
distinction does not divide them. To further support this conclusion, though, we must 
consider how Stanley develops his argument in How Propaganda Works.
V. Deeper into Stanley’s political critique
In Stanley’s outline of his argument in How Propaganda Works, he links the distinction be-
tween practical and theoretical knowledge with a distinction between (merely) manual la-
bor and intellectual labor. The thought that “some groups … are best equipped for practi-
cal tasks and others for theoretical tasks” is said to justify “the desire to relegate one group 
of society to the task of manual labor.” (Stanley 2015, xviii-xix) By rejecting the practical/
theoretical distinction, he aims to undercut the “flawed ideology” that grounds the manual 
labor/intellectual labor distinction. Following Gramsci he claims that “the distinction … 
between practical skill and intellectual reflection cannot be drawn. There are no laborers, 
no wage earners, no people whose activity is solely a matter of physical strength.” (Stanley 
2015, 272)
Stanley fleshes out his argument with a historical analysis showing how this flawed ide-
ology undergirded the development of an educational system based on a strict division of 
intellectual education and vocational training in early twentieth century America. This 
system in turn reinforced and perpetuated class distinctions favoring elites over the lower 
classes.6 But Stanley prefaces this analysis with a discussion of Ancient Greek debates over 
slavery (Stanley 2015, 270-1):
5 Ryle’s discussions of teaching, training, coaching, and the development of skill, are informed by his 
experiences not only as a philosophy professor, but also as an undergraduate rower (captain of the 
Queens College team in his last year), and later, as a rowing coach. J. D. Mabbott reports that Ryle 
“gave up many afternoons to coaching” and recalls “listening with fascination to him instructing a St. 
John’s Eight, with a flow of metaphors ranging from reproachful elephants and camels to commenda-
tory swallows.” (Mabbott 1993, 224)
6 Ryle’s attitude towards such a system can perhaps be inferred from his close connection to his older 
sister, Effie Ryle, a Quaker who worked with the Adult School Movement in Great Britain. Effie au-
thored a number of texts for teaching working class adults such subjects as Latin and the Bible, and 
worked as a teacher of working men and women. (Martin 1924, 200, 244, 247, 364). In the latter part 
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…Aristotle argues that the master and the slave engage in two quite distinct kinds of activities. 
… the slave is naturally born to know how to perform servile activities. In contrast, those in the 
household who are “above toil” have others attend to their household while they “occupy them-
selves with philosophy or with politics.” … The Ancient Greeks recognized that practical skill re-
vealed intelligence. But … they did have a category for a kind of labor that was not intelligent in 
nature. Let us call this manual labor or menial labor. Aristotle thus provides a natural basis for 
a division of society into groups, one of which will serve as the source of the leaders, and one of 
which is thought of specifically as the source of manual labor. The characteristic defense of class 
distinctions is an ideologically flawed belief in a distinction between theory and practice, or be-
tween mere practical skill and the exercise of theoretical knowledge. The ideology of class elitism 
rests upon a belief, already clearly articulated in Plato and Aristotle, that at least one group in so-
ciety is not capable of theoretical activity, but only of manual labor.
Although Stanley writes that Aristotle’s slave is “born to know how to perform servile ac-
tivities,” he sees this Aristotelian/Rylean “know how” as not truly knowledge, since it is 
not a form of knowledge-that.7 He concludes that to distinguish theoretical and practical 
knowledge is to equate the servile activities of the slave with “manual labor” that is “not in-
telligent in nature.” The Rylean distinction between two forms of knowledge, two ways in 
which intelligence can be manifested, becomes a distinction between mere practical skill 
and the exercise of (theoretical, that is real) intelligence and knowledge. But Ryle’s view on 
the interdependence of the two forms of knowledge breaks the link between the practical/
theoretical distinction, and a problematic distinction between knowledge-less manual la-
bor and knowledge-laden intellectual work. Yet it is this link that allows Stanley to see his 
intellectualist position as crucial to dismantling the flawed ideology supporting slavery and 
other forms of elitism.
Ryle’s discussion of “The Primacy of the Intellect,” in chapter IX of The Concept of 
Mind, might be seen as evidence that Ryle does accept the problematic form of the practi-
cal/theoretical distinction, however. There, Ryle seeks to avoid the apparent consequence 
of his view that “since planning and theoretical operations can themselves be characterized 
as purposive, skillful, careful, ambitious, voluntary and the rest, I regard these operations 
merely as special occupations on all fours with such occupations as tying knots, following 
tunes, or playing hide-and-seek.” Fending off this “democratisation of the offices of the old 
elite,” which “will have seemed … shocking,” (Ryle 1949, 280) he claims that “intellectual 
work has a cultural primacy, since it is the work of those who have received and can give a 
higher education,” adding that “barbarians and infants do not do intellectual work, since, if 
they did, we should describe them instead as at least part-civilised and near to school age.” 
of her life, Effie lived with Ryle’s mother, his twin sister Mary, and Mary’s adopted daughter Janet, in a 
house in Bucklebury, Berkshire, in which Ryle also lived when not at Oxford. (Author’s interview with 
Janet (Ryle) Beckley, November 4, 2015.) It is not unlikely that Ryle discussed pedagogy with his elder 
sister. Putting together Ryle’s work coaching Oxford undergraduates in rowing (see note 5) with his 
sister’s work teaching working class men and women the classics that formed the backbone of a British 
public school education, we get a very different conception of schooling than one depending on a strict 
separation of vocational training and intellectual education.
7 Compare Stanley in “Knowing (how)”: “According to the Rylean, knowing-how is a relation that 
holds between a person and an action-type. It is distinct from knowing, which is a relation that holds 
between a person and a proposition.” (Stanley 2011a, 226)
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(Ryle 1949, 314) The prejudices on display here are not surprising in an academic whose 
career was devoted to the promotion and growth of the discipline of philosophy. But they 
are neither intrinsic to, nor supported by, Ryle’s distinction between knowledge-how and 
knowledge-that. Intellectual work is as much a form of knowledge-how as skilled physical 
labor, for Ryle; his bias in favor of intellectual work does not reflect an over-valuation of 
knowledge-that as opposed to knowledge-how, but an over-valuation of certain forms of 
knowledge-how, exhibited in following and delivering lectures, being amused at witticisms, 
constructing Greek sentences, and calculating probabilities, to cite examples from The Con-
cept of Mind. (Ryle 1949, 314-317)
Therefore, Ryle’s distinction between knowledge-how and knowledge-that does not 
support a caste system in which the college professor and the plumber are separated by the 
former’s possession of elite intellectual knowledge-that and the latter’s possession of mere 
physical knowledge-how. The college professor, as teacher, as scientist, and as theoretician, 
is as much a knower-how as the plumber. The plumber may have as much knowledge-that 
as the college professor. Furthermore, the college professor’s knowledge (both knowledge-
how and knowledge-that) need not be more reflective than that of the plumber, nor need 
the plumber’s knowledge be more “automatic” than that of the professor. Both the profes-
sor’s and the plumber’s knowledge-how essentially involves “performing critically … in or-
der to get things right.” Ryle’s point is to enable us to recognize knowledge-how as much as 
knowledge-that as knowledge, a manifestation of our intelligence and rationality, without 
having to be the “step-child” of intellection, ratiocination, and knowledge-that.
This goal is an essential part of his larger project in The Concept of Mind. Ryle’s at-
tack on the “intellectualist legend” constitutes the first salvo of his critique of “the dogma 
of the Ghost in the Machine,” that “every human being has both a body and a mind,” so 
that “a person … lives through two collateral histories, one consisting of what happens in 
and to his body, the other consisting of what happens in and to his mind.” (Ryle 1949, 11) 
Ryle’s overarching claim is that this “dogma” is “entirely false … one big mistake … a phi-
losopher’s myth.” (Ryle 1949, 26) But this dogma is in a relation of mutual support with 
the “intellectualist legend.” People are “drawn to believe … that the intelligent execution 
of an operation must embody two processes, one of doing and another of theorising” be-
cause, “wedded to the dogma of the Ghost in the Machine,” they conclude that “muscu-
lar doing cannot itself be a mental operation.” In consequence, they think that for an ac-
tion “to earn the title ‘skilful’, ‘cunning’, or ‘humorous’, it must … get it by transfer from 
another counterpart act occurring not ‘in the machine’ but ‘in the ghost’; for ‘skilful’, 
‘cunning’ and ‘humorous’ are certainly mental predicates.” (Ryle 1949, 32) Ryle aims to 
show, in contrast, how “muscular doing” can “be a mental operation”; how, in the bal-
lerina’s dance or the plumber’s pipe repair, a person’s mindedness, intelligence, rational-
ity, and knowledgeableness is directly present and at work – not “manifested,” but simply 
there. For a human being as a rational animal, there can be no distinction for Ryle, such 
as Stanley condemns, between “mere practical skill and the exercise of theoretical knowl-
edge” – the word “mere” suggesting that practical skill does not really exhibit intelligence, 
rationality, or knowledge. The distinction between knowledge-less manual labor and 
knowledge-laden intellectual work, to which Stanley equates the practical/theoretical dis-
tinction, is directly opposed to the spirit of Ryle’s distinction between knowing how and 
knowing that. Seen in this light, Ryle’s project, as opposed to his prejudices, is in essence 
profoundly democratic and egalitarian. In fact, Ryle’s thought subsequent to the publica-
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tion of The Concept of Mind moved away from elitism towards democratization, following 
the logic of his own position.
VI. Political dangers of (hyper-) intellectualism? 8
In a posthumously published essay, simply titled “Reason,” Ryle developed an argument 
that at least some forms of intellectualism are liable to dangerous social and political conse-
quences of the sort Stanley sought to avoid. The paper replays Ryle’s critique of intellectu-
alism, with the concepts of rationality and ratiocination (mentioned briefly in Ryle 1971c, 
219) playing the parts of intelligence and intellection. Ryle begins by asking how we can 
say “that one person is more reasonable or sensible than another, even though it is the sec-
ond person who has the superior powers of reasoning.” Along the way to explaining this, he 
makes “what looks like a detour.” (Ryle 1993, 67) It is this detour on which we will focus.
Ryle’s detour concerns “a prejudice or family of prejudices which vitiate people’s judg-
ments” concerning the relation between reasonableness and reasoning. (Ryle 1993, 67) Ryle 
wants to trace the source of a “muddle” (Ryle 1993, 69), namely the idea that “the mind or 
soul of a man consists of three departments of which the management-department is that 
which does all the thinking, knowing, inferring and so on.” This department, called “Rea-
son” is “given the task of supervising the other departments,” and “so we call people reason-
able if either they are good at theory, i.e. are logical, or they behave in a self-controlled way.” 
However, this raises the problem of forging a link between “being good at theory” and “be-
ing good at self-control.” (Ryle 1993, 68)
Ryle provides a bit of potted history to explain how this muddle arises. He tells us that 
“the Greeks were the effective inventors of … Theory. They found out how to theorise...”9 
They then asked “what is the salient difference between Greeks and barbarians?” and “what 
is the salient difference between men and animals?” They answered both questions by ap-
peal to “Theory”: human beings can theorize while animals cannot, and Greeks can theo-
rize “in an organised way” while barbarians cannot. They inferred that “Animals are ir-
rational, barbarians are sub-rational,” and concluded that “to say that men are rational 
meant … that men could perform … a particular sort of task, namely the regulated produc-
tion of assemblages of propositions, the construction and marshalling of propositions.” 
This was “the one thing which made Greeks superior to barbarians, and men to animals…” 
(Ryle 1993, 68)
Ryle has sketched here the core of Aristotle’s justification of natural slavery in the Pol-
itics, albeit without mentioning Aristotle by name. Since barbarians lack an effective ra-
tional faculty, as shown by their lack of theoretical activity, they also lack the self-control 
8 I borrow the term “hyper-intellectualism” from John Protevi. (Protevi 2015, 8)
9 Ryle exhibits his own prejudices here, as well as in his 1962 paper “A Rational Animal,” where he 
writes “Human rationality has here separate and, if you like, genuinely academic objectives and chores 
of its own, objectives and chores in which the Greeks could with justice say that barbarians, being to-
tally unschooled, could not participate.” (Ryle 1971b, 436) I am not summarizing his telling of the his-
tory in order to endorse it; nor do I wish to argue that Ryle was immune to flawed ideological belief. 
My concern is with the philosophical consequences of his position. (See footnotes 13 and 15 for fur-
ther discussion of Rylean prejudices and stereotypes.)
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needed for a flourishing and virtuous human life, and will benefit from being enslaved to 
masters in possession of full rationality – the part of us which defines us as human and dif-
ferentiates us from the other animals. In How Propaganda Works, Stanley claimed that this 
Aristotelian argument rests on the distinction between theoretical knowledge and practical 
skill. But Ryle traces the justification of slavery back to the (hyper-)intellectualist assump-
tion that to be reasonable is to be guided by reasoning.
Ryle argues that the resulting conception of the role of reason in human life is confused 
by constructing a “fictitious story.” His parable concerns an isolated civilization in which 
there is an obsession with Contract Bridge: the culture, education, and economy revolve 
around the game. In two sentences, Ryle makes the link to Aristotle explicit: “They collect 
slaves in raids but don’t teach them the cards. Their philosophers… define man as a Bridge-
playing animal; and a barbarian as a person who hardly plays cards at all.” (Ryle 1993, 69)
Ryle elaborates this fiction in various highly amusing ways, before coming to the ob-
vious response that Bridge can’t be set up as the one defining human feature even though 
animals don’t play Bridge and people do. Bridge involves the use of intellectual capacities 
which are “exercised not only in other games but in other things that are not games,” so 
playing Bridge is “only one facet of the real differentia between men and animals.” (Ryle 
1993, 69) Ryle’s reply involves a version of the dependence of knowledge-that on knowl-
edge-how discussed above (Ryle 1993, 69-70):
What you say about the activity of Bridge-playing, I am saying about the activity of organising 
propositions into theories. … Yes, man is a ratiocinating animal, but he is a lot more besides – and 
indeed the fact that he can construct and appreciate valid arguments is itself only a special exercise 
of something which he can and does exercise in lots of other ways as well.
Ryle immediately turns, however, to “make concessions,” admitting that “theorising is one 
of the ways in which Man differs from animals – but not just in the way in which Bridge is 
one card game.” Ryle argues that practical competence is incompatible with complete in-
ability to theorize about one’s competence: “any lesson10 learned in the sphere of compe-
tence is a potential lesson learned in thinking. Learning how to tie knots is a lesson also in 
talking about knots – or a stage in that lesson.” (Ryle 1993, 71) This might seem to be an-
other facet of the dependence of knowing-how on knowing-that outlined above. But what 
is involved here is not really a dependence of knowing-how on particular knowing-that; it 
is rather a dependence of any knowing-how on at least a modicum of the specific theoretical 
knowing-how required to theorize about one’s competences.
While all of this is interesting and worthy of further thought, our focus is on Ryle’s 
critique of “prejudices that vitiate people’s judgments.” A comparison of “Reason” with 
the “The Primacy of the Intellect” section in The Concept of Mind suggests that Ryle was 
in part criticizing his own prejudices in the later essay.11 While he says in “Reason” that “a 
10 Following the transcription in the Linacre Journal, 76, rather than Aspects of Mind, which has “les-
sons.”
11 Ryle may have been influenced by his experience after the Second World War of teaching students 
from former colonies in Africa, and Asia. Ryle was the thesis supervisor of the Ghanaian philoso-
pher Kwasi Wiredu, who praises him along with Strawson and Hampshire as “wonderful teachers” 
(Wiredu 2003, 330); the Indian philosopher S. S. Barlingay writes of the support he received from 
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person who could not theorise at all could not act sensibly” (Ryle 1993, 70), this is quite 
different from his earlier over-valuation of intellectual work. In both places, Ryle is trying 
to understand the special role of the capacity for theorizing in human rational life. In The 
Concept of Mind, this takes the form of an explanation of “the sense in which intellectual 
operations are higher than, and do ‘govern’, the exercises of other mental capacities.” Ca-
pacities that are the result of “higher education” and provide “some degree of intellectual 
accomplishment” are highlighted as the mark of civilization. Ryle uses examples like be-
ing amused at a witticism by Voltaire, knowing the rules of Greek and Latin grammar, and 
identifying a magneto. (Ryle 1949, 314-7) In “Reason,” Ryle shows that “theorising is one 
of the ways in which man differs from animals – but not just in the way in which Bridge is 
one card game” using such examples as being able to think and talk about: managing one’s 
affairs, playing chess, sizing up one’s acquaintances, judging distances, and tying knots. 
There is a palpable sense of descent from the ivory tower in moving from the earlier to the 
later text.
Ryle’s argument in “Reason” makes clear that a version of intellectualism might fill a 
need to mark a distinction between slave-owners (Greeks) and slaves (barbarians), so as 
to justify the institution of slavery. I conclude with a historical case study, showing how at 
least one intellectualist, contemporary with Ryle, developed an account of human nature 
and the place of theoretical thinking in human intelligence that supported a racist and hi-
erarchical ideology.
In his Manual of Psychology,12 G. F. Stout, editor of Mind and teacher of both Russell 
and Moore, distinguished “animal intelligence” from “human intelligence” in terms remi-
niscent of Ryle’s “intellectualist legend” (Stout 1901, 276):
The vast interval which separates human achievements, so far as they depend on human intel-
ligence, from animal achievements, so far as they depend on animal intelligence, is connected with 
the distinction between perceptual and ideational process. Animal activities are either purely per-
ceptual, or, in so far as they involve ideas, these ideas only serve to prompt and guide an action in 
its actual execution. On the other hand, man constructs “in his head,” by means of trains of ideas, 
schemes of action before he begins to carry them out. He is thus capable of overcoming difficul-
ties in advance. He can cross a bridge before he comes to it.
Stout credits some intelligence to animals, who do not engage in prior mental planning. 
But, he claims, such thinking is required for the higher form of truly human intelligence. 
Arguably, this view is in the target range of Ryle’s attack on intellectualism, and would fall 
into the category of Stanley’s “unreasonable intellectualism.”
Ryle who was “willing to take me under his wing,” “was very good in personal discussion,” and se-
cured him an introduction to L.E.J. Brouwer (Barlingay 1994,19-21); and the Chinese philosopher 
Chen Lee Sun credits Ryle with providing a “refuge” from an unnamed college don who had taken 
a disliking to her, and with being “the only heavyweight intellectual who had seriously tutored me in 
my life.” (Sun 2011, liv-lv). 
12 The books Ryle donated to Linacre College library included a copy of the second edition, from which I 
quote. Ryle’s annotations reveal Stout’s influence on his thought, especially concerning the idea of “au-
tomatisms” produced by “habit,” and “feeling-tone” of sensation. See “Ryle’s ‘Intellectualist Legend’ in 
Historical Context” for further discussion.
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In his Preface, Stout sets up a program, justified on Darwinian grounds, but mirroring 
the story Ryle told about Greeks seeking to differentiate themselves from barbarians along 
the same scale on which they differentiated humans from animals (Stout 1901, vi):
The present work contains an exposition of Psychology from a genetic point of view. A glance 
at the table of contents will show that the order followed is that of the successive stages of mental 
development. The earlier stages have been copiously illustrated by reference to the mental life of 
animals. The phases through which the ideal construction of Self and the world has passed are il-
lustrated by reference to the mental condition of the lower races of mankind.
Such was the plan for a highly influential textbook of psychology that went through five 
editions between 1899 and 1938. Let us see how this plan was carried out in several inter-
esting cases.13
According to Stout, the “perceptual process” characteristic of “animal intelligence” has 
an “impulsive character” and lacks the unity “implied in the concept of a person.” Conse-
quently, “we must deny personality to animals,” since they are “in the main creatures of im-
pulse.” (Stout 1901, 276) He argues that “self as a whole uniting present, past and future 
phases, and the world as a single coherent system of things and processes, are ideal construc-
tions, built up gradually in the course of human development.” He extends this to the claim 
that “the ideal construction of Self and of the world,” while absent in animals, “is compara-
tively rudimentary in the lower races of mankind…” (Stout 1901, 277) Here, Stout sets up 
a threefold hierarchy of development: civilized men, savages, animals. He repeatedly ap-
peals to this hierarchy, and its organizing principle is always the same: a supposed differ-
ence in intellectual development.
In one passage, Stout takes up the problem Ryle attributed to the ancient Greeks, of 
connecting “being good at theory” and “being good at self-control” (Stout 1901, 628):
Self-control is greatest in the man whose life is dominated by ideals and general principles of 
conduct; but this involves a development of conceptual consciousness which is absent in children 
and savages. We accordingly find that children and savages are to a great extent creatures of im-
pulse; they have comparatively little power of deliberation…14
13 Stout was hardly alone in the kinds of views I sketch here. Ryle himself was not wholly innocent of the 
racist stereotypes of his day. He repeats several times the example of “the sharper-eyed Red Indian” (also 
“lynx-eyed”) who is unable to observe a football goal or a checkmate, for want of the proper training. 
(Ryle 1971a, 154; Ryle 1971b, 83, 88; in Ryle 1970b, 44, it is the “unschooled Red Indian” who “can 
neither solve nor mis-solve problems in multiplication and spelling.”) In the section on “The Primacy of 
the Intellect” in The Concept of Mind, Ryle equates “savages,” with infants: “every advanced craft, game, 
project, amusement, organisation or industry is necessarily above the heads of untutored savages or in-
fants, or else we would not call them advanced.” (Ryle 1949, 317) Yet Ryle’s point in such cases always 
concerns the way in which someone’s “wits” have been trained or tutored. He never asserts an intrinsic 
difference in the innate quality of those “wits,” as is suggested in Stout’s talk of “lower races.”
14 The passage continues in a veritable deluge of racist stereotypes, occupying almost a full page of the 
Manual, in which Stout emphasizes the similarity of “savages” to “young children” in their supposed 
impulsiveness, indulgence, wastefulness, lack of concern for the future, inability to pursue remote ends, 
lack of industry, and failure to understand the value of time – all of which “often sorely tries the pa-
tience of the civilised European.” Lacking the ability for advanced planning characteristic of “human 
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In a subsequent discussion of “True Freedom,” we find that “savages” barely have personal-
ity or character (Stout 1901, 633):
Character exists only in so far as unity and continuity of conscious life exists and manifests it-
self in systematic consistency of conduct. Animals can scarcely be said to have a character, because 
their actions flow from disconnected impulse. … Character is little developed in savages as com-
pared with civilised men; for they have relatively little power of considering particular actions in 
relation to an organised system of conduct.
The principle that “we have in savage races examples of stages of mental development in-
comparably more rudimentary than our own,” so that “by noting the points in which they 
differ from us we may obtain a clue to the nature of the differences between ourselves and 
primitive man” (Stout 1901, 482) shapes many of Stout’s discussions, especially in his 
chapter on “Belief and Imagination” which is full of examples of the superstitious beliefs of 
savages.
A particularly striking example occurs in his account of the “unity of consciousness.” 
Stout distinguishes the “mental life of the animal … composed of a series of detached and 
independent impulses” from the “interweaving of interests in a system” that “constitutes 
the unity of personal life,” which itself “may exist in very varying degrees.” He runs down 
a hierarchical ordering: “the mental life of such men as Hegel, or Comte, or Bismarck, or 
Newton, forms a far more systematic unity than that of the man in the street”; “the mental 
life of the civilised man is, in general, far more completely unified than that of the savage”; 
and finally “the mental life of man has a unity which is not found in the animal.” (Stout 
1901, 85)
We are already primed to expect the ordering of “savages” as somewhere between an-
imals and the fully human “civilised man.” But Stout’s comparison of “unity of personal 
life” of Hegel, Comte, Bismarck and Newton with that of the “man in the street,” mirrors 
Stanley’s example of the college professor and the plumber.15 Stout gives no reason other 
intelligence,” savages, like young children, value trivial present affairs over “the great business of life.” 
Stout concludes: “The bird in the hand is to them worth a thousand in the bush.” (Stout 1901, 628-9)
15 Something like this progression can be found in the concluding paragraph of Ryle’s 1962 paper “A Ra-
tional Animal” (Ryle 1971d, 433-4):
If we enjoy the egotistical pastime of giving to mankind testimonials which we withhold from other 
creatures; or if, more sensibly but still platitudinously, we like to give to civilized man testimonials which 
we withhold from uncivilized man, and to civilized man at his highest, which we half-withhold from civi-
lized man at his decent but unglorious mean, we shall certainly lay great, though not exclusive, emphasis on 
his past performances and his future promises as a theorist, that is, as an advancer of knowledge, no matter 
whether this be knowledge of nature, mathematical knowledge or knowledge of human ways and human 
callings.
 However, Ryle distances himself from the “egotistical” and “platitudinous” pastimes of giving testi-
monials to the accomplishments of those who have been able to achieve much thanks to educational 
advantages. Furthermore, he immediately adds a warning: “What we must not do is to confuse testi-
monials with explanations. Yet this is just what we do when we treat special and specially inculcated 
proficiencies as elemental agencies or forces…” (Ryle 1971d, 433) This, however, is exactly what Stout, 
with his talk of higher and lower races, is guilty of.
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than intellectualist prejudice to suppose that the mental life of, for example, Newton, is 
more unified than that of a plumber. Newton was a great physicist and mathematician. 
He was also a reclusive, sometimes delusional dabbler in alchemy. His obsessive secretive-
ness caused one of the great controversies of modern science through his failure to publish 
his discovery of the infinitesimal calculus, followed by his claims of priority (many of them 
carried out anonymously) when Leibniz published his own version.16 None of this matters 
to Stout, who judges Newton’s unity of consciousness directly from his intellectual out-
put. We see here how Stout’s supposedly scientific claims about the mental state of “sav-
age races” are really just reflections of his own prejudice in favor of, to use Ryle’s metaphor, 
“Contract Bridge” over other card games.
It would be a fallacy to conclude that Stanley’s form of intellectualism is liable to the 
same misuses as Stout’s. Stanley would rightly be horrified by any suggestion that his phi-
losophy might keep such company, and would view Stout’s position, with its focus on con-
scious planning, as an unjustified hyper-intellectualism, to be contrasted with his own rea-
sonable intellectualism. Moreover, early 20th century “anti-intellectualists,” as they were 
widely called, can easily compete with intellectualists like Stout for a place in the appropri-
ate circle of hell. The prominent psychologist William McDougall, who popularized the 
phrase “the intellectualist fallacy” to refer to “assigning intellectual processes as the springs 
of action” (McDougall 1960, 387), was a racist and a eugenicist. (Richards 1998, 153) 
Shortly after moving from Oxford to Harvard, he published a truly vile tract, “Is America 
Safe for Democracy?” sketching a “New Plan” to “favor increase in the birth-rate among 
the intrinsically better part of the population, and its decrease among the inferior part.” 
(McDougall 1921, 192) “Anti-intellectualism” was also associated in the period between 
the two World Wars with the rise of fascist and totalitarian regimes. Ryle would have en-
countered the phrase in his reading of the works of the Italian philosopher Giovanni Gen-
tile, early in his philosophical career. (Ryle 1970a, 3) Gentile would become an apologist 
for Mussolini, writing in The Spectator that “the condemnation of intellectualism may be 
said to have become the common denominator of all Fascist literature.”17 (Gentile 1928)
Perhaps because of these associations, Ryle never called himself an “anti-intellectualist,” 
though that label is typically pinned on him in the current literature.18 What our discus-
sion of his arguments in “Reason” makes clear is that his distinction between knowledge-
how and knowledge-that, far from being intended to alienate and divide, was consciously 
opposed to a form of intellectualism which, as embodied in Stout’s influential Manual, may 
have helped to prop up colonial oppression. Consequently, were Stanley to reject Ryle’s dis-
tinction between knowledge-how and knowledge-that as divisive and alienating, he would 
come close to inverting the historical situation. Yet unless he can paint Ryle’s distinction in 
this light, he has no ground for asserting that his “reasonable intellectualism” is necessary to 
16 On the life of Newton, see (Gleick 2003).
17 I discuss this history, and Ryle’s relation to Gentile, in more detail in “Ryle’s ‘Intellectualist Legend’ in 
Historical Context.”
18 I argue in “Ryle’s ‘Intellectualist Legend’ in Historical Context” that Ryle was charting a middle course 
between the “intellectualisms” and “anti-intellectualisms” of his day. Similarly, the rigid dichotomy be-
tween “intellectualist” and “anti-intellectualist” views on knowledge-how in the contemporary debate 
has obscured Ryle’s own position from view.
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save us from a flawed ideology. For Ryle’s “reasonable non-intellectualism,” as we might call 
it, offers the same benefits.
VII. Conclusion
How might Stanley respond to the argument of this paper? A comparison might be made 
here to Stanley’s discussion of another aspect of his earlier work in How Propaganda Works. 
In Chapter Five, “Political Ideologies,” Stanley uses his theory of the interest-relativity of 
knowledge (or “pragmatic encroachment”) to explain the way in which a flawed ideology 
prevalent in a society can lead to forms of epistemic injustice. Stanley’s explanation turns 
on the idea that when the stakes are high for an individual in determining whether some-
thing is true, the justificatory bar they have to reach to be able to claim knowledge about 
this question is raised. This yields a situation in which oppressed groups find that they have 
to meet a higher bar to claim knowledge about their own oppression, which is thereby oc-
cluded. (Stanley 2015, 252-5) Similarly, since knowledge is the norm of assertion, members 
of oppressed groups find that their claims of oppression lack authority. (Stanley 2015, 261)
However, Stanley recognizes that there are alternative explanations of the phenomena 
which he takes to support the interest-relativity of knowledge, such as the view that raising 
the stakes does not raise the justificatory bar, but makes belief more difficult; the view that 
raising the stakes reduces the degree of belief; and the “error theory” according to which in 
high stakes situations there is still knowledge but it is misperceived as a lack of knowledge. 
(Stanley 2015, 256-8) In response, Stanley argues that “it is not relevant” whether knowl-
edge is interest-relative, since “every competing explanation also results in a very similar and 
equally destructive form of epistemic debilitation,” and that “the knowledge norm of asser-
tion, together with the interest-relativity of knowledge, or any of the suggested alternatives, 
entails that negatively privileged groups will be severely hindered in democratic delibera-
tion.” (Stanley 2015, 255, 261)
Similarly, Stanley might reply to my challenge that the core of his critique of the ide-
ology of elites remains unaffected, since his argument will go through whether we accept 
his intellectualist position or Ryle’s form of non-intellectualism. Stanley’s objection is to a 
form of anti-intellectualism that supports a sharp distinction between manual labor and in-
tellectual work, a distinction which is congealed into the structure of an educational system 
strictly separating vocational training and liberal education. If both Stanley’s intellectual-
ism, and Ryle’s non-intellectualism undercut such a strict separation, so much the better, 
from the point of view of Stanley’s political argument.19
In fact, I think this is the correct response for Stanley to make. However, making it 
concedes the main point of this paper. Ryle’s views on knowledge do not have the invidious 
political consequences of supporting a flawed ideology. Indeed Ryle offers arguments aimed 
at a hyper-intellectualism which functioned to provide such a support. Consequently, both 
“hyper-intellectualist” views assimilating knowledge-how to an overly-intellectualized con-
ception of knowledge-that, and “anti-intellectualist” views relying on a misconceived form 
of Ryle’s distinction between the practical and the theoretical, are amenable to the kind of 
19 I am indebted to an anonymous referee in this paragraph.
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ideological misuse that Stanley wishes to eschew. Ryle’s own position, however, provides 
an ideologically benign viable alternative to Stanley’s reasonable intellectualism. Therefore, 
the debate over the nature of knowledge-how turns out not to have the political weighti-
ness claimed for it by Stanley.
We appear, then, to have arrived at a stalemate. For, after all, I have not provided any 
reason to prefer the Rylean account over Stanley’s view. But I close with a pair of questions. 
When a college professor proposes to explain how plumbers are the equals of college pro-
fessors by arguing that the plumber’s knowledge of plumbing really just is the same sort of 
thing as what the college professor specializes in producing —“intellectual recognition of 
truths”— and that it is “only when [it] is guided by” such recognition that the plumber’s 
behavior “deserves to be called ‘intelligent’” (Stanley 2011b, 190) – how thankful should 
the plumber be for such assistance? Wouldn’t our plumber perhaps prefer a position like 
Ryle’s, which fully recognizes the dignity of his plumbing knowledge, without equating it 
with another kind of thing?20
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